The Lede

An Idea for Democrats to Keep It Together in 2028

民主党人如何在2028年保持团结的一个构想
What if a candidate picked a running mate from another faction of the Party right away, and they ran on a unified vision?
如果候选人一开始就从党内另一派系中选定竞选搭档,并基于统一的愿景共同参选,会怎样?
July 16, 2026
Illustration of a bicycle with two seats
Illustration by Ben Hickey

It’s an odd moment for the Democratic Party—and thus for those Americans who, stuck in a two-party system, are depending on it for a route out of the mess that is now Washington. New polling shows that the Democrats are ahead on the midterm “generic ballot,” and stand to do at least as well in the House of Representatives as they did in 2018, when they won back control of that chamber, gaining a net total of forty-one seats. (They need to be doing well, since partisan redistricting seems likely to set them back ten seats.) But, at the same time, polls show that Americans are even less satisfied with the Democrats than they are with the Republicans, and the Democratic Party itself is threatening to cleave. Following the recent win for Zohran Mamdani’s choice of democratic-socialist primary candidates in New York City, James Carville, Bill Clinton’s former campaign strategist, said, of one of the winners, that this is “not who we are,” and the former Democratic National Committee chair Jaime Harrison tweeted, “If you hate the Democratic Party, then please don’t run for our nomination. Don’t use our resources.” Third Way, a “centrist” advocacy group, is apparently planning a big campaign against the Democratic Socialists of America, the political home ground of Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, even though polling also shows that “socialism” is remarkably popular with Democratic voters—but perhaps not so surprisingly, given that America’s premier democratic socialist, Senator Bernie Sanders, is also its most popular politician currently in office. And then there’s Graham Platner, the progressive turned anchor dragging down the Democrats’ Senate hopes in Maine. All this kerfuffle may not prevent a win for the Democrats in the midterms—Trump’s historic unpopularity means that many people will turn out just to vote against him. But pulling the country from the authoritarian reflecting pool into which it has fallen will take at least the election after that, the Presidential election in 2028. And winning the reforms that matter (a non-weaponized Supreme Court, for instance) might take a number of years after that. Each will require a Democratic Party more or less at peace with itself, and one that recognizes its need for both some coherence and some flexibility.

对民主党来说,这是一个微妙的时刻——对那些困在两党制中、指望靠它走出华盛顿当前乱局的美国人来说,同样如此。最新民调显示,民主党在中期选举的“一般性投票”中处于领先,在众议院的表现至少有望与2018年持平,那一年他们净增41个席位,重新夺回了众议院控制权。(他们必须表现良好,因为党派性的选区重划很可能让他们先损失十个席位。)但与此同时,民调也显示,美国人对民主党的满意度甚至低于共和党,而民主党自身也面临分裂的危险。佐兰·马姆达尼(Zohran Mamdani)支持的民主社会主义初选候选人近期在纽约市获胜后,比尔·克林顿的前竞选策略师詹姆斯·卡维尔(James Carville)谈到其中一位胜者时说,这“不是我们的本色”,前民主党全国委员会主席杰米·哈里森(Jaime Harrison)则在推特上写道:“如果你讨厌民主党,那就请不要来角逐我们的提名。不要用我们的资源。”中间派倡导组织“第三条道路”(Third Way)显然正在筹划一场针对“美国民主社会主义者”(Democratic Socialists of America)的大规模行动,而该组织正是众议员亚历山德里娅·奥卡西奥-科尔特斯(Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez)的政治大本营——尽管民调同样显示,“社会主义”在民主党选民中异常受欢迎。这或许并不那么令人意外,毕竟美国最知名的民主社会主义者、参议员伯尼·桑德斯(Bernie Sanders),也是当前在任政治人物中最受欢迎的一位。此外,还有格雷厄姆·普拉特纳(Graham Platner),这位进步派人士转身成了拖累民主党在缅因州参议院选情的锚点。所有这些纷扰或许并不会阻止民主党在中期选举中获胜——特朗普历史性的不受欢迎意味着,许多人会仅仅为了投票反对他而出门投票。但要把这个国家从它跌入的威权主义倒影池中拉出来,至少需要等到那之后的选举,即2028年的总统大选。而要赢得那些真正重要的改革(比如一个不被武器化的最高法院),可能还需要再花上好几年。这一切,都需要一个大体上内部和睦的民主党,一个认识到自己既需要某种一致性、也需要一定灵活性的民主党。

You can feel significant figures in the Party trying to guide it in this direction. In May, for instance, Maryland’s Chris Van Hollen, the former head of the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, argued in an opinion piece for the Times that, on the divisive issue of American support for Israel, all Democratic Presidential candidates should make it clear that they will recognize a Palestinian state. “Primary voters won’t trust any Democratic presidential candidate who does not have a record of moral and strategic clarity on these issues,” he wrote.

你能感觉到党内一些重要人物正试图引导党朝这个方向走。例如,今年五月,马里兰州参议员、曾任民主党参议院竞选委员会主席的克里斯·范·霍伦(Chris Van Hollen)在《纽约时报》的一篇评论文章中主张,在美国支持以色列这一分裂性议题上,所有民主党总统候选人都应明确表示,他们将承认巴勒斯坦国。“在这些问题上,没有道德和战略清晰度记录的民主党总统候选人,初选选民是不会信任的,”他写道。

There are, however, limits to the impact of particular policy positions—who knows what firestorm will flare up during the next campaign? So it’s also worth imagining whether there are some structural ways that the Democrats could signal their seriousness about uniting, and their commitment to an alliance in the long term. Here’s one idea: candidates for President should consider naming, and campaigning with, their Vice-Presidential pick from Day One.

然而,特定政策立场的影响力有其局限——谁知道下一场竞选期间会爆发什么风暴?因此,也值得想一想,民主党是否可以通过某些结构性的方式,来表明他们对团结的认真态度,以及对长期结盟的承诺。这里有一个想法:总统候选人应考虑从第一天起就选定副总统人选,并与之共同竞选。

Imagine this scenario (and feel free to substitute in other names). Say that, a few months after the midterms, Governor J. B. Pritzker, of Illinois, strides to a lectern in Springfield to announce a run for the White House, with the usual bunting and copious references to Abraham Lincoln, but standing with him is Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez. He says that, since he would turn sixty-eight by the end of his first term, and since there is a clear desire among Americans for younger leaders, it makes sense for him to plan on serving just one term, and then to support the Vice-President for a run in 2032. She says that, since she’s short on executive experience, as opposed to legislative experience, it would be a logical step to spend four years as Vice-President—and that she’ll still only be forty-three on Inauguration Day in January, 2033.

想象一下这个场景(你可以随意替换其他人名)。假设中期选举几个月后,伊利诺伊州州长J.B.普利兹克(J. B. Pritzker)大步走上斯普林菲尔德的一个讲台,宣布参选白宫,现场照例挂满彩旗,并大量引用亚伯拉罕·林肯,但与他并肩而立的,是亚历山德里娅·奥卡西奥-科尔特斯。他说,鉴于他在第一任期结束时将年满68岁,且美国人明显渴望更年轻的领导人,他计划只担任一届总统是合理的,然后在2032年支持副总统参选。她则说,既然她缺乏行政经验(与立法经验相对),花四年时间担任副总统将是合乎逻辑的一步——而且到2033年1月的就职日,她也才43岁。

This plan seems as if it could accomplish any number of useful things. It signals that the candidates’ primary campaign would center on broad areas of agreement that unite centrists and progressives, rather than on the things they might contest: both are against authoritarianism and for action to broaden access to health care; both support more affordable homes and lower electric bills; both are eager for a transition to clean energy; and both are keenly focussed on community college as a key part of building a workforce for the future. In truth, the divisions between the various factions in the Party are not as deep as sometimes imagined—if you look closely, Joe Biden was a very Bernie President, determined to use large-scale government action to transform the economy. But there are also real differences in both style and emphasis, and this would be a way to bridge them—to announce, in short, that these views are not too disparate to animate the same Administration. Call it a government of Democratic unity.

这个计划似乎可以达成许多有益的效果。它表明,候选人的初选竞选将围绕团结中间派和进步派的广泛共识领域展开,而非聚焦于他们可能争执的议题:双方都反对威权主义,支持采取行动扩大医疗保健覆盖面;都支持建造更多可负担住房和降低电费;都渴望向清洁能源转型;都高度关注社区学院,将其视为培养未来劳动力的关键一环。事实上,党内各派系之间的分歧并不像有时想象的那么深——如果你仔细观察,乔·拜登其实是一位非常“伯尼式”的总统,决心动用大规模政府行动来改造经济。但在风格和侧重点上,也确实存在真实的差异,而这种方式正是一种弥合差异的途径——简而言之,就是宣告这些观点并非过于迥异,以至于无法为同一届政府注入活力。不妨称之为民主团结政府。

At the same time, if it worked, it would signal that the Party would be behind these goals for the long haul, that it understands it will take time to get them done, but that it is committed to keeping up the effort—and that would project a kind of maturity that’s been lacking from our personality-driven politics. It’s a little closer to the European model, in which the parties themselves stand for very specific platforms that extend beyond election periods. American politics has been much too ego-driven in recent years: it’s been Bill or Barack or Joe—and now, of course, it’s Donald Donald Donald. Making the Democratic Party vision driven, instead, and making that vision both sharp and broad, might stop the pendulum swinging as crazily as it has of late. Americans might be open to the idea of a more coöperative, less chaotic politics after the Trump years.

与此同时,如果此举奏效,它将表明民主党将长期致力于这些目标,它明白实现这些目标需要时间,但它承诺会持续努力——这将展现出一种我们由个人驱动的政治中所缺乏的成熟。这更接近欧洲模式,即政党本身代表着超越选举周期的、非常具体的纲领。近年来,美国政治过于受个人野心驱动:先是比尔,再是巴拉克,然后是乔——现在,当然,是唐纳德、唐纳德、唐纳德。让民主党转而由愿景驱动,并使这一愿景既鲜明又宽广,或许能阻止钟摆像近来这样疯狂摆动。在经历了特朗普时代之后,美国人或许会接受一种更具合作性、不那么混乱的政治。

Vice-Presidential candidates have tended to be afterthoughts in past elections, added to the ticket at the last minute to bring a boost in enthusiasm (and, actually, a fairly minimal one, the polling would indicate); this change in strategy could produce the opposite effect. And, by campaigning together longer, the candidates could bring each other real advantages. To return to our example: Pritzker is a fairly logical candidate for President—he’s been an effective and well-liked governor of a Midwestern state, someone who has resolutely stood up to Trump while attending to the needs of his constituents. (I follow Pritzker’s Bluesky feed, and there are lots of pictures of him with shovels breaking ground on things. He’s also won a ban on assault weapons, protected reproductive rights, and passed on-time budgets that have raised Illinois’s credit rating.) However, he’s a billionaire, which is enough to set him back with some portions of the Democratic base, and he’s a longtime supporter of Israel, though he broke with AIPAC some years ago and has been consistent in his criticism of the Netanyahu government.

在过去的选举中,副总统候选人往往像是事后才想到的,在最后一刻被加入竞选名单以提振热情(而且民调显示,这种提振实际上相当有限);这一策略上的改变则可能产生相反的效果。而且,通过更长时间的共同竞选,候选人可以给对方带来实实在在的优势。回到我们的例子:普利兹克是一位相当合乎逻辑的总统候选人——他是一位高效且受人喜爱的中西部州长,在坚决对抗特朗普的同时,也悉心处理本州选民的需求。(我关注了普利兹克的Bluesky账号,上面有很多他拿着铁锹参加破土动工的照片。他还成功推动了攻击性武器禁令,保护了生殖权利,并通过了按时预算,提升了伊利诺伊州的信用评级。)然而,他是个亿万富翁,这足以让他在部分民主党基本盘中失分,而且他长期支持以色列,尽管他几年前已与美国以色列公共事务委员会(AIPAC)决裂,并一直批评内塔尼亚胡政府。

A.O.C. takes the tarnish off those potential electoral weak spots; no one is going to jeer at Pritzker for his wealth if she vouches that he’s committed to the needs of the working people that she’s descended from. Meanwhile, A.O.C. is popular with the base and beyond; she increasingly reads as politically savvy. But, in America, her ideology (self-professedly socialist), gender, and ethnicity might make some Democrats nervous to nominate her straight up, and it would be a potent line of attack to point out that she’s never actually run anything—that she went to Congress before she was thirty. Pritzker—a white guy currently cruising to reëlection with high marks for handling infrastructure and education—smooths those wrinkles. There are trade-offs, of course—there will doubtless be a certain number of people who like Pritzker but can’t abide Ocasio-Cortez, and vice versa. And as for their own individual ambitions, who knows—maybe A.O.C. thinks she can win it out of the gate this time around and doesn’t want to take a chance on Pritzker cratering in the primary (or in office, for that matter, dooming his appointed successor). Maybe Pritzker wouldn’t want to be a lame duck from the jump. We’re used to the system we have; there will always be doubts about even small shifts like this.

奥卡西奥-科尔特斯可以抹去这些潜在的选举弱点上的锈迹;如果她担保普利兹克真心致力于满足她所出身于其中的劳动人民的需求,就不会有人因他的财富而嘲笑他。与此同时,奥卡西奥-科尔特斯在基本盘内外都很受欢迎;她越来越被视为政治头脑精明。但在美国,她的意识形态(自称社会主义者)、性别和族裔,可能会让一些民主党人对直接提名她感到紧张,而指出她从未真正管理过任何事务——她不到30岁就进了国会——将是一条有力的攻击路线。普利兹克——一个正以处理基础设施和教育问题的高分轻松迈向连任的白人男性——则能抚平这些褶皱。当然,这其中存在取舍——毫无疑问,会有一定数量的人喜欢普利兹克却无法忍受奥卡西奥-科尔特斯,反之亦然。至于他们各自的个人抱负,谁知道呢——也许奥卡西奥-科尔特斯认为她这次就能一举获胜,不想冒险押注于普利兹克在初选中(或就此而言,在任上)一败涂地,从而连累他指定的继任者。也许普利兹克不想从一开始就成为跛脚鸭。我们习惯了现有的体制;即使是这样微小的转变,也总会有人心存疑虑。

But this is the year to try something new: as best as I can tell, most Democrats, as opposed to Democratic pundits, are in a malleable mood, understanding that the priority is to take power and use it to make change: A.O.C. has said straight up in recent weeks that she’s more interested in winning on issues than in winning office, so she and her followers might well subordinate their immediate hopes for the top office. Of course, Pritzker and Ocasio-Cortez would actually have to like each other for such a thing to work, and I have no idea if they do. And their staffs would have to like each other, too, and to learn to work together on the trail (which would lead to actually working together in office). And everyone would have to temper their ambitions. But tempered ambitions, ideological coherence, some sense of programmatic consistency over time—the attractions seem to outweigh the disadvantages. Now’s the time for the Party to think about it—potential pairings have a little time to court one another—and to start talking themselves into the idea that this could be rewarding and even kind of fun.

但今年正是尝试新事物的一年:据我所知,大多数民主党人(与民主党评论家相对)都处于一种可塑的心态,他们明白首要任务是夺取权力并用它来推动变革:奥卡西奥-科尔特斯最近几周直截了当地说,她对赢得议题比赢得职位更感兴趣,因此她和她的追随者很可能会将他们对最高职位的近期期望置于次要地位。当然,普利兹克和奥卡西奥-科尔特斯必须真的彼此欣赏,这样的事才能奏效,而我完全不知道他们是否如此。他们的幕僚团队也必须彼此欣赏,并学会在竞选路上协同工作(这将导向在任上真正地合作)。而且每个人都必须收敛自己的雄心。但收敛的雄心、意识形态上的连贯性、某种随时间推移而保持计划一致性的感觉——其吸引力似乎超过了不利之处。现在是民主党思考这个问题的时候了——潜在的搭档组合还有一点时间来相互接触——并开始说服自己,这可能会带来回报,甚至有点意思。

The idea is to build a party that manages to unite (and to do so more than grudgingly) across its various wings, much as the opposition in Hungary did to defeat Viktor Orbán and now, hopefully, to stamp out Orbánism. But the primary process as currently constituted simply exacerbates the strains between the progressive and the establishment wings of the party—candidates position themselves in debates to see who occupies the various ideological “lanes,” and contests come down to a test of strength. Can the Bernieites beat the Clintonites and the Bidenites? Not quite, it seems, in large part because enough voters intuit that a progressive might win the nomination only to lose the general election—and yet the energy of the Party is probably more concentrated in its younger, lefter wing. This ongoing divide is a recipe for frustration at best and unthinkable defeat at worst. There doesn’t seem to be any structural barrier to telling the American people in advance whom your Vice-President might be, and it would open the door to the idea that change is afoot—but change in the direction of a new and welcome stability. ♦

这个构想的目的是建立一个能够跨越不同派系实现团结(并且不仅仅是勉强团结)的政党,就像匈牙利的反对派为击败维克托·欧尔班(Viktor Orbán)所做的那样,现在则有望根除欧尔班主义。但目前既定的初选过程,只会加剧党内进步派与建制派之间的紧张关系——候选人在辩论中为自己定位,看谁能占据不同的意识形态“赛道”,竞争最终沦为一场力量测试。伯尼派能击败克林顿派和拜登派吗?似乎还差一点,很大程度上是因为足够多的选民直觉地认为,进步派可能赢得提名,却会输掉大选——然而,民主党的活力或许更多地集中在其更年轻、更左倾的一翼。这种持续的分裂,往好了说是令人沮丧的根源,往坏了说则可能导致不堪设想的失败。提前告诉美国人民你的副总统人选可能是谁,似乎并没有什么结构性的障碍,而这将为一种变革正在发生的理念打开大门——不过是朝着一种新的、受欢迎的稳定方向变革。 ♦

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