New Maps Show How Israel Has Thwarted Hopes for a Palestinian State
Ten years ago, Frank Lowenstein, then the United States special envoy for Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, presented President Barack Obama with maps of settlements by Israeli Jews in the occupied West Bank. The maps revealed that a chronic problem had turned critical. The expansion of settlements crisscrossing the West Bank threatened the hope of establishing a contiguous Palestinian state there. As Jews and Palestinians lived in roughly equal numbers in Israel and the territories it had occupied since 1967, those settlements also imperilled Israel’s claim to be both Jewish and democratic. By gradually accomplishing a de-facto annexation of the West Bank, the settlements would require Israeli Jews either to rule over a resentful non-Jewish population of about equal size or to surrender the Jewish identity of their state. From the perspective of the United States, either scenario would undermine the stability of the region.
Obama was in the final weeks of his Presidency, and Lowenstein’s maps helped persuade him to let the United Nations Security Council pass a resolution condemning the settlements, which most of the world had long considered violations of international law. (The U.S. declined to exercise its veto and abstained from the vote.) In a speech a few days later, on December 28, 2016, Secretary of State John Kerry defended that decision with a stark warning that settlement expansion was “increasingly cementing an irreversible one-state reality.” He continued, “Is ours the generation that gives up on the dream of a Jewish democratic state of Israel living in peace and security with its neighbors? Because that is really what is at stake.”
Ten years later, Lowenstein, now a policy fellow at the liberal Zionist advocacy group J Street, is still updating those maps. He told me that the breakneck expansion of officially authorized settlements and unauthorized (or not yet authorized) settler “outposts” has made Kerry’s warning seem impossibly hopeful. Last week, the government of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, in an apparent effort to shore up support ahead of the upcoming Israeli elections, issued a tender offer for the construction of another twelve hundred units of settler housing in a location explicitly meant to divide the remaining Palestinian-administered areas of the West Bank. The European Union and more than twenty governments, including the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, have urged Israel to immediately retract the tender, because the construction would “undermine the prospect of the two-state solution by driving a wedge through the West Bank.” The U.S. has not signed the statement. But the tender prompted even the Trump Administration to reiterate its opposition to the annexation of the West Bank, saying that “a stable West Bank keeps Israel secure.”
Lowenstein told me that the evolving maps have drained the meaning from those Obama-era debates about the viability of a Palestinian state, forcing a revision of the vocabulary that American politicians use to talk about the conflict. More than five hundred thousand Jewish settlers already reside among more than three million Palestinians in the West Bank, which has been designated as part of a future Palestinian state since the 1947 United Nations resolution that proposed the creation of the state of Israel. And the Israeli government’s support for those settlements has grown increasingly bold. During the eight years of the Obama Administration, Israel approved just three new settlements in the West Bank; since the start of 2023, roughly when the current Israeli government came to power, it has approved one hundred and four. It has authorized construction of more than fifty-eight thousand units of housing, and the total number of settlements and outposts has more than doubled over the same period, from about three hundred to about six hundred and forty. Violence against the Palestinians, meanwhile, has increased in tandem with the settlements, often perpetrated with the apparent protection or approval of the Israeli security forces. In 2016, the United Nations counted a hundred and seven settler attacks that damaged Palestinian property, caused Palestinian casualties, or both. Since 2023, the U.N. has documented more than fifty-three hundred—a rate of more than four a day. More than eleven hundred Palestinians in the West Bank have been killed either directly by settlers or by the Israeli security forces. (In the first seven months of 2026, there were at least one thousand three hundred and eighty settler attacks, a rate of more than six a day, and seventy-six Palestinians were killed.) Over the same three years, according to the U.N., demolitions and intimidation in the West Bank fully or partially displaced one hundred and seventeen Palestinian communities, uprooting over fifty-nine hundred Palestinians.
Where such assaults or evictions once occurred sporadically, Lowenstein told me, “now it is going haywire every day.” And since Hamas attacked Israel on October 7, 2023, the Israeli military has also devastated Gaza, taking over more than sixty-five per cent of its territory, damaging or destroying over ninety per cent of the homes. Almost all of Gaza’s two million residents now live crowded into tent camps in the remaining thirty-five per cent of the land. (The Israeli assault has killed more than seventy thousand Palestinians.)
“The conversation has gone from ‘What can we do to get to a two-state solution?’ to ‘What can be done to stop Israel from literally taking all of the land?’ ” Lowenstein told me. His latest maps—compiled with his associate Liam Hamama, based on statements from the Israeli government and on data from the advocacy group Peace Now, the Palestinian administrative authority in the West Bank, and U.N. agencies—make clear that to envision any viable form of Palestinian self-rule would now require more than an Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and a halt to settlement growth. It would entail a major rollback of the existing settlements and outposts—evicting the Israeli Jews who established them. Lowenstein argued that a more immediate goal would be persuading Israel to give back at least some of the land to the Palestinians. But Israel’s current political climate makes such a proposal almost inconceivable in the short term. Lowenstein told me that when he served as special envoy, Prime Minister Netanyahu and other Israeli leaders would at least profess support for some distant, hypothetical Palestinian state. Yet in 2025, after the politics of both Israel and the United States had drifted to the right, the Israeli Knesset passed a nonbinding resolution declaring that “Israel has the natural, historical and legal right” to the West Bank and Gaza. Netanyahu is now campaigning for reëlection on the promise that he will never allow the establishment of a Palestinian state, and far-right figures in his Cabinet have suggested that they would like to drive out the Palestinians now living in Gaza. “The Israeli paradigm has shifted to ‘We are going to have the full right to all of the land,’ ” Lowenstein told me.
In this context, talking about American support for a future two-state solution, as many politicians in both parties continue to do, is like musing about an alternative history. It is no longer relevant. Instead of allowing politicians only to repeat talking points about eventual Palestinian statehood, Lowenstein argued, Americans should ask candidates the more pertinent question: Will you press Israel, right now, to begin putting more land back in Palestinian hands? Likewise, he continued, voters should not accept “pro-Israel” as a meaningful description of a candidate’s views. With the settlements fast expanding the practical boundaries of the Jewish state, the relevant question is not “Do you support Israel?” The question is: Which Israel do you support? The internationally recognized Israel, with the borders that preceded its 1967 conquests? Or a vision of Greater Israel, in which it formally annexes those territories, and the Jewish half of the population either rules over or seeks to expel the half that is Palestinian?
Kerry, in his warning speech nearly a decade ago, noted how the borders of the Jewish state had moved over time. The 1947 U.N. resolution proposing a partition of the territory left the Palestinians about forty-three per cent of the land between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea. In the wars that immediately followed, Israel expanded its share to seventy-eight per cent of the land, leaving just twenty-two per cent for the Palestinian half of the population. The Oslo Accords, signed over thirty years ago, gave Palestinians at least administrative control of limited areas as a first step toward eventual control of the West Bank and Gaza—almost all of that twenty-two per cent of the land. But on the most recent map, Lowenstein told me, the settlements and outposts, and the military operations in Gaza, appear to permanently confine the Palestinians to control of even less than those limited areas, amounting to just eight per cent of the total land. Israel fully controls about ninety-two per cent. Lowenstein asked, “Ninety-two per cent of the land for fifty per cent of the people—how is that sustainable?” ♦